

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JO, US, XF, MASS

SUBJ: GENERAL EADE'S CALL ON KING HUSSEIN

1. SUMMARY: IN HALF-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH KING HUSSEIN, HE PROVIDED GENERAL EADE WITH HIS VIEWS ON INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF WAR IN MIDDLE EAST, NEED TO MAINTAIN NEGOTIATION MOMENTUM WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA, ARAB USE OF OIL WEAPON AND DANGEROUS POSSIBILITIES FOR WORLD PEACE INHERENT IN SUCH A STEP, JORDANIAN DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS AND RELATIONSHIP TO PLO, IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING AND MODERNIZING JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, AND JORDAN'S WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST WITH MILITARY FORCES IN LOWER GULF AND PARTICULARLY OMAN. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS AND STATEMENT OF WELCOME ON PART OF KING HUSSEIN, GENERAL EADE INQUIRED ABOUT KING'S VIEWS ON IMMINENCE OF WAR IN THE AREA, ESPECIALLY RELATING TO CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH LEBANON.

3. KING SAID HE WAS FEARFUL THAT SITUATION WAS MOVING MORE IN THE DIRECTION OF WAR THAN IT HAD BEEN IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS. JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE HAD SIGNS THAT

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FORCES UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL WERE INCREASINGLY PRESENT

IN SOUTH LEBANON. THIS WAS UNSETTLING, BUT IT ALSO APPEARED THAT MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE HAD SLOWED DOWN. LAST SUMMER, ISRAEL HAD TWO POSSIBLE AREAS ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD MOVE AHEAD--WITH JORDAN ON WEST BANK AND WITH EGYPT ON SINAI FRONT. NOW ONLY LATTER OPPORTUNITY WAS LEFT AND IT WAS IMPORTANT MOMENT FOR US TO ASSERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE AND ENERGY IN THAT DIRECTION. JORDAN'S LOST OPPORTUNITY SHOULD NOT BE REPEATED WITH EGYPT. IF EGYPT WERE TO MOVE THEN THERE WAS ALSO REAL POSSIBILITY OF GETTING SYRIA TO FOLLOW ON, BUT LACK OF MOVEMENT WAS INCREASING DANGER OF WAR.

4. GENERAL EADE IN RESPONSE STRESSED POINT THAT WE WERE DOING ALL POSSIBLE IN THE SITUATION. AMBASSADOR PICKED UP THIS THEME AND ELABORATED ON IT NOTING THAT SITUATION WAS OBVIOUSLY ONE IN WHICH WASHINGTON AWARE OF DANGERS, ALLON VISIT WAS COMING UP AND CERTAIN ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON FLEXIBILITY ON PASSES GAVE REASON TO AVOID OVERPESSIMISM ON SUBJECT. SYRIA ALSO WOULD PLAY A KEY ROLE AND IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT ASAD WISHED TO MOVE INTO WAR.

5. KING THEN TALKED ABOUT HIS CONCERNS IN CONNECTION WITH ARAB USE OF OIL IN SOMEWHAT FAMILIAR TERMS. HE NOTED THAT CLOSURE OF CANAL IN 1956 WITH CUT-OFF OF MID-EAST OIL HAD BROUGHT BRITIAN AND FRANCE INTO A WAR IN MIDDLE EAST. HE ABHORRED ARAB IRRESPONSIBILITY IN USING OIL, NOTING THAT PRICE INCREASE ESPECIALLY HAD HURT THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND THAT ARAB LEADERS SEEMED TO BE CARELESS ABOUT AND OFTEN OBLIVIOUS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD THEIR OWN PEOPLES' WELFARE AND WELFARE OF THEIR LESS FORTUNATE NEIGHBORS. IT WAS A DANGEROUS AND DIFFICULT SITUATION WHICH HAD TO BE CLEANED UP.

6. NOTING THAT JORDAN HAD COME BACK FROM RABAT CONFERENCE IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POSITION THAT IT WENT, AND JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH REST OF ARAB WORLD, EXCEPT LIBYA, EXTREMELY GOOD NOW, HE SAID THAT CERTAIN DOMESTIC CHANGES HAD TO BE MADE. HOWEVER, HE WOULD MOVE VERY SLOWLY ON ANY FURTHER CHANGES WHICH MIGHT DEFINE

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WITH FINALITY JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS AS SEPARATE GROUPS. JORDAN FACED REAL PROBLEMS AS TO WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE -- FOR THOSE WHO CAME IN 1948/1950 WHEN BOTH BANKS WERE OFFICIALLY JOINED, OR FOR ALL OTHERS PRESENT IN THE KINGDOM FOLLOWING JUNE OF 1967. AS A RESULT HE HAD DECIDED TO MOVE VERY VERY SLOWLY ON THIS QUESTION.

7. DISCUSSION THEN MOVED ON TO JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES,

WHICH GENERAL EADE REMARKED WERE IMPRESSIVE, PROFESSIONAL AND HAD A PROUD AND SUCCESSFUL TRADITION. KING NOTED HIS STRONG ATTACHMENT TO CONTINUING US RELATIONSHIP AND NEED FOR MODERNIZATION WITH RABAT "WAR CHEST" AND REPEATED POINT WHICH HE HAS MADE OFTEN IN THE PAST THAT JORDAN STOOD READY TO SEND ITS BOYS ELSEWHERE IN THE ARAB WORLD IF THIS WAS WHAT ITS ARAB BROTHERS DESIRED. THEY WERE NOT AFRAID TO FIGHT. QUESTION HAD COME UP OF SENDING A BATTALION TO OMAN TO HELP IRANIAN AND ARAB FORCES THERE -- KING SAID HE HAD IN MIND ONE OF HIS SPECIAL FORCES BATTALIONS. OMAN WANTED FORCES, SHAH WHEN HE WAS HERE SAID HE WELCOMED MOVE, AND KING WOULD TAKE IT UP WITH FAISAL DURING HIS VISIT NEXT WEEK. KING WOULD ALSO HAVE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR SUCH AN OPERATION, IMPLYING THAT FAISAL (AND US?) MIGHT BE ASKED TO DO MORE THAN JUST APPROVE IF THEY AGREED WITH THE IDEA.

8. ALSO DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, KING NOTED THAT IT APPEARED THAT PLO SEEMED DETERMINED ON CREATING AN INCIDENT OR INCIDENTS WITH ISRAEL WHICH WOULD LEAD BACK TO WAR AND SLOW NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. HE HAD INFORMATION THAT PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS IN FEDAYEEN GROUPS WERE BENT ON THIS COURSE AND THAT MAY WELL EXPLAIN IN PART RECENT INCREASED ACTIVITY IN SOUTH LEBANON WHERE SITUATION, IN HIS VIEW, WAS GROWING MORE AND MORE UNCERTAIN AND DIFFICULT.
PICKERING

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.

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